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Abstract
This paper interprets accidents occurring on the way to and from work as negative health
shocks to identify the causal eﬀect of health on labor market outcomes. We argue that in
our sample of exactly matched treated and control workers, these health shocks (predomi-
nantly impairments in the musculoskeletal system) are quasi-randomly assigned. A ﬁxed-eﬀects
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach estimates a negative and persistent eﬀect on subsequent em-
ployment and income. After initial periods with a higher incidence of sick leave, treated workers
are more likely unemployed, and a growing share of them leaves the labor market via disability
retirement. Those treated workers, who manage to stay in employment, incur persistent income
losses. The eﬀects are stronger for sub-groups of workers who are typically less attached to the
labor market.
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A positive correlation between health and socio-economic status is well documented in social and
medical sciences. This quantitatively important association, which has been identiﬁed across time,
place, sex and age, holds for a variety of health outcomes and any measure of socio-economic sta-
tus.1 However, a considerable debate about the causal underpinnings of this relationship remains.
The identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects has proven to be extremely diﬃcult (Deaton and Paxson, 1998;
Goldman, 2001; Fuchs, 2004).
It is obvious that income aﬀects health. Wealthier individuals live and work in healthier
environments, aﬀord better medical care, and income can support acquisition of other goods and
services that contribute to better health. However, higher income may also imply long hours and
more stress; factors which oﬀsets possible beneﬁcial eﬀects of income on health. On the other
hand, a causal eﬀect of health on income, as described in the health production framework by
Grossman (1972), is equally evident. Good health is a prerequisite to work hard and to perform
on the labor market. Finally, both variables may simply be correlated with a third factor. One
possible confounding factor is given by a low rate of time preference. Individuals who discount
future beneﬁts relatively little are supposed to invest more in human capital, as well as to engage
in a healthier life-style. In this case, income and health are correlated, but not in any causal way.
A deeper understanding of this correlation is, however, crucial. It is important to distinguish
these explanations to understand the sources of health inequalities and to design eﬃcient (eco-
nomic) policy to improve health, welfare, and well-being. It is also relevant for broader economic
issues such as growth, intergenerational transmission of human capital, labor force participation,
and the optimal design of social insurance. Due to the nature of the problem randomized exper-
iments are mostly not feasible and/or not appropriate. Thus, scholars have to rely on natural
experiments in order to identify causal eﬀects.2 A small number of papers have managed to estab-
lish a causal eﬀect of income on health.3 In sum, these papers (all studying data from developed
countries) ﬁnd positive but quantitatively small eﬀects of income on (mental) health.
An even smaller number of papers explore the causal eﬀect of health on income. It seems even
harder to ﬁnd and to measure arguably exogenous variation in health compared to income. Wu
(2003) argues that severe health conditions – such as strokes, cancer or diabetes – can be interpreted
as exogenous health shocks. In a similar vein, Riphahn (1999) deﬁnes a negative health shock as
a sudden and substantial drop in subjective health, and Wagstaﬀ (2007) uses a substantial drop
in the body mass index. However, there are some doubts regarding the exogeneity of such events.
For instance, Charles (2003) analyzes the dynamic eﬀects of a disability on earnings and ﬁnds that
earnings have already dropped one year before the onset of the disability. A diﬀerent approach is
given by accidents. Reville and Schoeni (2001) and Crichton, Stillman and Hyslop (2011) study
the eﬀects of workplace (and non-workplace) accidents on employment and income, and Moller
Dano (2005) estimates the eﬀect of severe road accidents on labor market outcomes and public
1For a review of this literature, see, for instance, Strauss and Thomas (1998); Smith (1999).
2A notable exception of an experimental setting is given by Thomas et al. (2006).
3On an individual-level scholars exploit exogenous variation in income due to inheritances (Meer, Miller and
Rosen, 2003), lottery winnings (Lindahl, 2005; Gardner and Oswald, 2007; Apouey and Clark, 2010) and the German
reuniﬁcation (Frijters, Haisken-DeNew and Shields, 2005). Based on cohort data Adda, Banks and von Gaudecker
(2009) use changes in income mainly related to changes in the macro-economic environment. The identiﬁcation of
Michaud and van Soest (2008) comes from dynamic linear panel data techniques.
2transfers.4 The evidence presented in these papers is somewhat mixed, which may be explained
by varying types of accidents used; however, shows by and large negative eﬀects of accidents of
subsequent labor market outcomes.
In this paper, we follow a similar approach; however, we focus on a special type of accident.
We interpret accidents occurring on the way to and from work (such as road accidents, slip and
fall accidents and injuries due to falling objects) as negative health shocks. This has a number of
attractive features: (i) the way to and from work is part of the daily routine of every employed
individual and is (in contrast to general road accidents) not aﬀected by leisure time activities, (ii)
the likelihood of such a commuting accident is (as compared to a workplace accident) not related
to self-selection into certain jobs, oﬀering compensating wage diﬀerentials for hazardous workplace
environments, (iii) due to an institutional detail of the Austrian mandatory social accident insur-
ance we can observe the universe of commuting accidents in Austria, and link these to the Austrian
Social Security Database, a linked employer-employee data-set.
This research design allows us to implement a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) approach to es-
timate the causal eﬀect of such a negative health shock on subsequent labor market outcomes.
Following Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) – who have shown that in the presence of lon-
gitudinal data, matching and diﬀerencing can be fruitfully combined to weaken the underlying
assumptions of both methods – we compile a sample of matched treated and control individuals,
who share an observationally identical (labor market) history. Thanks to our rich data – before and
after the treatment – we can address the usual concerns about this approach. Most importantly,
we ﬁnd strong evidence for a common trend in pre-treatment labor market outcome across treated
and control units (common trend assumption). Based on data from a mandatory health insurance,
we can further show that the two groups have been following the same trends in objective health
outcomes before the treatment. We argue that within our research design commuting accidents
are quasi-randomly assigned, and constitute negative health shocks that enable us to establish a
causal eﬀect of health on employment and income.
Which type of health shocks do commuting accidents generate? While we have no information
on the type of injuries in our individual level data, we can resort to aggregate statistics.5 These
show a wide range of injuries: head and neck (31 percent), trunk (16 percent), upper limbs (11
percent) and lower limbs (18 percent), potentially accompanied by mental stress. That means,
our health shocks are predominantly impairments in the musculoskeletal system. Given that these
are common and widespread types of diseases (such as chronic back pain, spinal disc herniation or
arthritis) – which are not only caused by commuting accidents – our research design provides an
opportunity to precisely estimate a causal eﬀect of a relevant type of health shock on labor market
outcomes. Therefore, this parameter should also be of interest to policy makers. In contrast,
our research design does not allow us to infer on the eﬀects of typical lifestyle diseases, such as
cardiovascular diseases, strokes or cancer.6
Our estimation results show that negative health shocks (i.e., predominantly impairments in
the musculoskeletal system) that result in an initial average sick leave spell of 46 days, reduce
4Relatedly, Lindeboom, Llena-Nozal and van der Klaauw (2007) use accidents of any type (reported by survey
respondents) as an instrument for disability status to study the eﬀect of a disability on employment.
5Note, aggregate injury statistics are only available for accidents with subsequent hospitalization and do not
distinguish between commuting accidents and all other road accidents. Source: Kuratorium f¨ ur Verkehrssicherheit.
Freizeitunfallstatistik 2007.
6In any case, it is hard to think of exogenous variation in the incidence of these lifestyle diseases.
3the likelihood of subsequent employment persistently. Five years after the commuting accident,
treated workers are still about four percentage points less likely employed. Initially the treatment
increases the likelihood of sick leave, then treated workers are more likely unemployed, and over
time a growing share of them leaves the labor market via disability retirement. The treated who
manage to stay in employment experience persistent income losses of about minus two percent. The
size of the estimated eﬀects varies along the dimensions of sex, occupation, and age. Employment
eﬀects are strongest for female, older and blue-collar workers. The highest income losses (up to
minus three percent) are observed for young workers. While we do not observe much adapting
behavior of treated workers in terms of job mobility, we ﬁnd evidence that treated female workers
adjust their fertility behavior in response to the negative health shock.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: First, we discuss our research design and
outline relevant institutional facts. This section also describes the data and provides descriptive
statistics for our estimation samples. The next two sections explain our estimation strategy and
discuss the identifying assumption. Subsequently, we present our estimation results for all workers
and explore heterogenous treatment eﬀects along the dimensions of sex, occupation and age. We
also examine potential adapting behavior and provide a discussion on the channels through which
treated individuals leave the labor market. The ﬁnal section summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 Research design
In Austria, a social accident insurance is mandatory for every employed individual, student and
pupil. The Austrian Workers’ Compensation Board (AWCB) is the major social accident insurance
institution and covers about 76 2 percent of all insurance holders.7 In 2007, the AWCB provided
insurance for more than 3 2 million employed individuals, 1 4 million self-employed and 1 3 million
students and pupils. Employers have to pay 1 4 percent of the total wage bill to the AWCB, which
amounted to 1 1 billion Euro in 2007 (Source: Handbuch der ¨ Osterreichischen Sozialversicherung
2008). The social accident insurance covers occupational accidents and occupational diseases.
Occupational accidents are unexpected external events causing injury, in locational, temporal and
causal relationship to the insurant’s occupation or education. Occupational diseases are health
impairments caused by the insurant’s occupation or education and are explicitly listed in the
annex to the General Social Insurance Act. Employers (and educational authorities) are bound by
law to report every occupational accident and disease to the respective social accident insurance
institution.
We exploit the fact that accidents occurring on the way between the place of residence and
the place of work (or education) are also classiﬁed as occupational accidents. We interpret these
commuting accidents as negative health shocks and argue that in a sample of exactly matched
treated and control workers, this special type of accident is quasi-randomly assigned.8 To construct
7Beside the AWCB three other social accident insurance institutions are responsible for special types of self-
employed and employees (and their dependants). The Social Insurance Institution for Farmers is responsible for
self-employed in agriculture and forestry (17 3 percent of insurance holders). The Insurance Institution of Austrian
Railways covers employees of the Austrian Railways and the Vienna Transport Authority (1 1 percent). Finally, the
Insurance Institutions for Public Service Wage and Salary Earners take care of civil servants at national, provincial
and local authority level with permanent tenure (5 4 percent).
8Accidents that occur to workers who are customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place of
business (e.g. outside sales workers or taxi drivers) are not counted as commuting accidents, except they occur
between the place of residence and the central oﬃce.
4our estimation sample we start with the AWCB Database and retrieve detailed information on all
workers who had a commuting accident that occurred between January 1, 2000 and December 31,
2002 and resulted in at least one day of sick leave (treated individuals). In the case workers had two
or more commuting accidents during this treatment period, we only consider the ﬁrst accident as
our treatment, since all following accidents may be causally aﬀected by the ﬁrst incident. Further,
we exclude all workers from the analysis who died in the quarter of the accident.9 All workers who
had no commuting accident during that period serve as potential control units.
The Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD) allows us to follow the treated and the control
individuals before, during and after the treatment period (until December 31, 2007). We observe
their labor market status in employment (including basic employer information), unemployment,
and various other qualiﬁcations on a daily basis. The ASSD collects detailed information on all
workers in Austria. Since the ASSD is an administrative record to verify pension claims the
information is very precise. Information on wages is provided per year and per employer. The lim-
itations of the data are top-coded wages and the lack of information on working hours (Zweim¨ uller,
Winter-Ebmer, Lalive, Kuhn, Wuellrich, Ruf and B¨ uchi, 2009). In combination with the database
from the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance we can compute each individual’s commuting dis-
tance in kilometers based on the zip code of her place of work and her place of residence. Moreover,
the latter database allows us to obtain some information on working hours (i.e. full-time versus
part-time employment).
Our potential control group consists of all workers who have been employed (and insured with
the AWCB) at least once during the treatment period (otherwise they have not been at risk to have
a commuting accident) and had no commuting accident. In order to distinguish a pre- and post-
treatment period for our control units, we randomly assign a quarter between January 1, 2000 and
December 31, 2002. If control units have not been employed in their randomly assigned quarter,
we exclude them from our analysis, since information on employment in that quarter is crucial
for our matching procedure (see below).10 To generate a homogenous sample we only consider
individuals who were ‘regularly’ employed in the treatment quarter, i.e. we exclude workers in
marginal employment or dependent self-employment. Furthermore, we restrict our analysis to
individuals who were employed as either blue-collar or white-collar workers throughout the pre-
treatment period.11 Finally, to guarantee that we can (potentially) observe all individuals before
and after the treatment on the labor market we restrict our sample to individuals between 25 and
50 years of age at the time of the (potential) accident.
After applying these sample selection criteria we observe 1 682 602 individuals without an
accident, and 11 397 individuals with an accident that resulted at least in one day of sick leave.12
We use the length of the sick leave spell after the accident as a proxy for severity. This information
9Workers who died later are included until their quarter of death. In our sample, 1 27 percent of treated workers
and 1 26 percent of control workers die in the post-treatment period.
10The assignment of a random quarter for control units ensures that each individual serves as a potential control
unit only to treated workers who had their accident in the respective quarter and not to all treated workers. This
strategy is similar to randomly drawing control groups without replacement to groups of injured workers stratiﬁed
by treatment quarter.
11That means that we exclude civil servants, self-employed and farmers. This guarantees that we can observe
pre-treatment wages for all individuals. The ASSD does not provide information on wages of civil servants; wages
of self-employed and farmers are only recorded since 1997.
12About 5 000 individuals had an accident but had zero days of sick leave. We exclude these individuals from our
analysis since they obviously were not injured due to the accident.
5is documented in the AWCB database. The distribution of weeks on sick leave is shown in Figure1.
On average, the sick leave spell lasts about four weeks. Half of the individuals spend at least two
weeks on sick leave. Clearly, the length of this sick leave spell is an imprecise measure for the
severity of the accident, since it might vary with worker’s motivation to return to work. This
problem is mitigated (at least to some degree) by the fact that sick leave spells longer than three
days are subject to medical veriﬁcation. Moreover, we see in a sub-sample (described in Appendix
B) that the sick leave spell length (among the treated) has a very high correlation with health care
service utilization. Still, we use the length of the sick leave spell with care and distinguish only
between accidents below and above the median, to deﬁne individuals with less and more severe
accidents. In our main analysis we will concentrate on the sub-set of 5 909 treated individuals with
more severe accidents.13 Most of these accidents (almost 65 percent) involve a vehicle. A signiﬁcant
fraction (about 33 percent) is due to slip and fall (e.g. on stairs, ice, snow or slippery ground).
The remaining two percent of accidents include, among others, injuries due to falling objects and
jamming. That means, the health shocks under consideration are predominantly impairments in
the musculoskeletal system.
It should be noted that workers who had an accident during their leisure time have almost no
possibility or incentive to cheat and to falsely report that the accident took place on the way to
or from work. Employees have to report the accident to the employer without delay, and in case
the injured worker needs medical treatment the exact time and date is recorded by the doctor or
hospital. Furthermore, irrespective of whether the accident happened on the way to or from work
or in leisure time, the health care cost and the compensation for lost wages caused by temporary
sickness are covered by an insurance in either case.14 This claim is supported by the distribution
of commuting accidents by weekday and daytime (see FigureA.1 in the Appendix A). As expected,
most of the accidents take place Monday through Friday, and during rush hours.
Table1 compares the average characteristics of treated and a random sample of control workers
in the quarter of the (potential) accident. Since we measure all characteristics on the ﬁrst day of
each quarter, the quarter of the (potential) accident is the last quarter of the pre-treatment period.
The comparison of treated and control individuals (the ﬁrst two columns) reveals that there are
some diﬀerences in the average characteristics of these two groups. Treated workers have a longer
commute (about plus four kilometers). This seems plausible; the longer the way to work the
higher the likelihood of a commuting accident. Further, treated individuals are slightly older
and more likely female.15 The most important diﬀerence is in the distribution of occupational
13In order to check the sensitivity of this sample selection criteria we alternatively used hospitalization to split
the sample. Clearly, the hospitalization decision is less discretionary than the amount of sick leave. The estimation
results have the same patterns across the two sample selection criteria (compare Table2 and 3 with TableA.1 and
A.2 in the Appendix A) – the employment eﬀects are at a higher level in the latter case, since these are on average
more severe accidents.
14Depending on whether the accident is occupational or non-occupational, the health care cost are either covered
by the social accident insurance or the social health insurance. In both cases, the compensation for lost wages (the
so-called Entgeltfortzahlung) is initially (i.e. at least eight weeks) disbursed by the employer. After a certain length
of sick leave this compensation is covered by the social accident insurance or the social health insurance, respectively.
The only important diﬀerence exists is with respect to rehabilitation cost. In case of an occupational accident the
social accident insurance may provide special occupational retraining and extra disability beneﬁts.
15Notably, the sex distribution of commuting accidents is in stark contrast to that of any other type of accident. In
2002 females accounted only for 20 6 percent of all workplace accidents, 40 9 percent of road accidents, 29 0 percent
of sports accident and 45 2 percent of other leisure time accidents. Sources: Kuratorium f¨ ur Verkehrssicherheit
(Unfallstatistik 2002); own calculations based on the AWCB Database.
6groups. The share of blue-collar (white-collar) workers is higher among the treated (control).16
Consequently, we ﬁnd that treated individuals are less likely to have a degree, have somewhat
lower wages, slightly less working experience, and a shorter tenure. A plausible explanation for the
higher incidence of commuting accidents among blue-collar workers are diﬀerent work schedules.
Blue-collar workers are more likely to work in a shift system. That means, they have to commute
early in the morning or later at night. At these hours unfavorable lightening and road conditions
may promote accidents of any kind.17 In line with this supposition we see a clear pattern that
blue-collar workers accidents’ are more likely to happen very early in the morning or later at night
(see FigureA.1 in the Appendix A). Further diﬀerences can be found with respect to the type of
employers. Treated individuals tend to work in larger ﬁrms and are more likely employed in the
manufacturing sector. This partly reﬂects an unequal distribution of blue- and white-collar workers
across employers, but also a correlation with the commuting distance. Larger ﬁrms (or ﬁrms from
certain industries) tend to be in peripheral enterprise zones, which implies a comparable longer
commute for their employees.
These descriptive statistics suggest that commuting accidents do not happen perfectly ran-
domly, hence we are concerned with selection that might complicate the comparison of treated and
control individuals. To correct for diﬀerences between these groups, we perform exact matching
based on their labor market history, and apply a DiD approach (based on samples stratiﬁed by
sex, occupation, and age). After describing our matching procedure and the resulting sample,
we will spell out our identifying assumption and discuss potential pitfalls. We will also provide
supplementary analyses that substantiate the validity of our identifying assumption.
3 Empirical strategy
In the empirical analysis we combine two identiﬁcation strategies to uncover a causal eﬀect of
negative health shocks on labor market outcomes. First, we use exact matching to establish the
pre-treatment comparability of the treatment and control group, and second, we apply a DiD
estimator on the sample of matched treated and control units. In the context of longitudinal data,
the combination of matching and DiD can accommodate (i) diﬀerences in observed characteristics,
and (ii) diﬀerences in unobserved characteristics as long as they are constant over time (Heckman
et al., 1997). The DiD approach requires a common trend assumption, which implies that in
absence of the negative health shock the average labor market outcomes of treated and control
workers follow parallel paths over time. Since we have data for a long time period before the
(potential) treatment we can check the series of average outcomes of the two groups.
Figure3 shows the employment rate and the average daily wage (conditional on employment)
by treatment status. We normalize the quarter of the (potential) accident to zero and observe
each worker 20 quarters before and after the treatment. For both groups, the employment rate
increases rapidly up to the quarter of the (potential) treatment, when it becomes one, and decreases
thereafter. This pattern is a consequence of the fact that we select only workers who were employed
16The distinction between blue- and white-collar workers follows the Austrian legal deﬁnition and is recorded in
the ASSD. Blue-collar workers typically perform manual labor and are directly involved in the production process.
In contrast, white-collar workers are non-manual workers in supervising and administrative jobs.
17In fact it is documented that most of the pedestrian and vehicle occupant fatalities occur during the change
from daylight to twilight or vice versa (Ferguson, Preusser, Lund, Zador and Ulmer, 1995).
7in this quarter. As these workers are also more likely to have been in employment in the periods
leading to the reference quarter, we observe an increasing (decreasing) employment rate in the
quarters preceding (subsequent to) the reference quarter. What is important to notice, is that we
observe a common trend in employment among treated and control prior to the quarter of the
(potential) treatment. This is clear evidence for a common underlying trend of treated and control
units. The observed drop in the employment rate after the (potential) treatment is ﬁrst evidence
for an eﬀect of the health shock on employment. An equivalent picture can be observed for the
average daily wage. When analyzing wages we always restrict our sample to employment spells,
since positive wages are observed only for employed workers.18 After the (potential) treatment,
we observe a slower wage growth path for treated workers, which is ﬁrst evidence of a negative
eﬀect of the health shock on income. Alternatively, FigureA.2 in the Appendix A provides a
regression-adjusted graphical depiction that removes the pattern caused by the selection rule.)
On the basis of the full sample we perform exact matching of treated and control units. In
the quarter of the (potential) treatment individuals must have the same sex, age (13 age groups:
25−26, 27−28, ..., 49−50), education (no academic degree, engineer, MA/MSc, PhD)19, region of
residence (West, East, South, abroad/missing), industry (agriculture, ﬁshing, mining and energy;
manufacturing; construction; wholesale, retail and repair; transport and communication; services;
missing) and commuting distance (by quintile group plus additional groups for zero and missing
distance). On top of that, in the quarter of the treatment and in each of the three preceding
quarters their employment status (employed, not employed), broad occupation (blue-collar, white-
collar), and the log of the deﬂated daily wage rate (by decile groups plus an additional group for
non-employed individuals) must coincide.20 Further we use their quarter of (potential) treatment
as a matching criterion. Since some treated individuals may have more control subjects than others
we construct weights that compensate for diﬀerences in cell size.21
Applying this matching procedure we are able to ﬁnd at least one control unit for 58 percent
of our treated individuals, i.e. our estimation sample consists of 3 406 treated and 26 734 control
units. Columns three and four of Table1 provide descriptive statistics for the matched sample.
While treated and control workers should not diﬀer in the matching variables (e.g. age, daily
wage, commuting distance), it is reassuring that diﬀerences in characteristics that were not among
the matching variables, for instance, experience and tenure, are only minor. The only exception
is with respect to ﬁrm size; still, matched treated workers are employed in larger ﬁrms than their
control counterparts.22
Based on this sample we estimate the impact of a negative health shock on labor market
outcomes (such as employment and income) up to ﬁve years after the treatment. To make sure
that we partial out potential remaining (un)observed heterogeneity we apply a DiD approach to
18Note, the drop in the average wage in the quarter of the (potential) accident is a consequence of the fact that we
restrict our sample to employment spells when looking at wages. In the reference quarter, all workers – also those
with the least earnings potential – are employed.
19Engineer (‘Ing.’) is a legally protected professional title that is granted to graduates from higher vocational
schools with technical orientation after three years of work experience.
20Note, in the quarter of treatment all workers are employed.
21The weights for treated and controls are constructed as follows: treated have a weight of wi = 1 and controls












C are the number of treated and controls in cell S.
22It can be noted that our estimation results are robust to using ﬁrm size as an additional matching criterion.
Detailed estimation output is available upon request.
8our sample of exactly matched treated and control units. We start with a simple DiD model:
outcomeit = α0 + α1Ti + α2Pt + α3Pt × Ti + βXi(t) + θt + ǫit  (1)
where i denotes individuals and t denotes time measured in quarters running from −20 to 20. In
a ﬁrst step we consider the two outcomes, employment and income. To capture employment we
use a binary variable equal to one if individual i is employed on the ﬁrst day of the quarter t, and
zero otherwise. Income is measured by the log of the deﬂated daily wage rate. The binary variable
Ti is equal to one if individual i is treated and zero otherwise. The variable Pt captures the post-
treatment period. For simplicity, we pool in a ﬁrst step all quarters in the pre-treatment period
and in the post-treatment period and use a binary variable instead of a full set of quarter dummies.
Further, we control for absolute (calendar) time-ﬁxed eﬀects θt (consecutive quarter dummies) and
a set of individual characteristics Xi(t) that comprises age-ﬁxed eﬀects and further characteristics
that are predetermined at the quarter of the (potential) treatment.23 The parameter of primary
interest is α3, which gives the estimated causal eﬀect of the negative health shock.
In order to allow for varying eﬀects of the negative health shock over time, we extend the model
in the following way






δrQr × Ti + βXi(t) + θt + εit  (2)
where Qr denotes a series of binary variables equal to one if the treatment has been r quarters ago.
This dynamic model allows us to trace out the full dynamic response of employment and income to
the negative health shock, where the estimated causal eﬀect r quarters after the treatment is given
by δr. We check the robustness of our results by including in both models individual ﬁxed-eﬀects
which account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. In this case, the treatment indicator
Ti and all predetermined characteristics are dropped, and Xi(t) only comprises age dummies.
4 Identifying assumption
The main identifying assumption is that the potential labor market outcomes of treated and
controls are independent of the treatment status conditional on observed and time-invariant unob-
served characteristics, i.e. the remaining error term is not correlated with the probability to have
an accident and potential labor market outcomes.
Under which conditions would this assumption fail? A potential pitfall of our estimation
strategy is that a job-loss (or a drop in income) causes the accident and not vice versa. Fortunately,
we will see below that the eﬀect of the accident on employment (and on income) kicks in only with
some lag. In other words, the timing of the events strongly rejects the case of reverse causality.
Another source of problems are unobserved confounding factors that vary over time. Put
diﬀerently, we have to ponder on a third factor that causally aﬀects labor market outcomes and
23We control for the following characteristics measured in the quarter of the accident: sex, education (no academic
degree, engineer, MA/MSc, PhD), citizenship (Austrian, non-Austrian), broad occupation (blue-collar, white-collar),
place of residence (nine states), location of ﬁrm (nine states plus missing), commuting distance (by quintile group
plus additional groups for zero and missing distance), industry of the ﬁrm (agriculture, ﬁshing, mining and energy;
manufacturing; construction; wholesale, retail and repair; transport and communication; services), ﬁrm size (log of
the number of employees), tenure (in years), work experience (in years), and the quarter of the (potential) accident.
9that is also correlated with a higher accident probability. Obviously, there is a plethora of factors
promoting an accident. Assignment into treatment may result, for instance, from own inattention,
sleepiness, other careless traﬃc participants, bad weather or lightening conditions, as well as any
other form of distraction. Some of these factors are undoubtedly exogenous; a third party’s fault
or bad weather conditions should not be correlated with the treated individual’s subsequent labor
market outcomes. However, inattention or sleepiness might be the result of already existing health
problems or another drastic personal event that may independently aﬀect labor market outcomes.
To be more speciﬁc, if (i) another drastic personal event (such as sickness, alcoholism, divorce,
or death in family) takes place at the same time, (ii) that is the (only) causal determinant of the
observed changes in labor market outcomes, and (iii) that is also causing (or at least correlated)
with the accident, our identifying assumption would fail, and we would erroneously conclude that
the negative health shock aﬀects labor market outcomes. While a high incidence of such systematic
patterns (i.e. all three conditions are fulﬁlled) seems unlikely, we can not completely rule it out. To
substantiate our interpretation that the estimated eﬀects are causally related to the negative health
shock, and not caused by any other unobserved personal event, we conduct three supplementary
analyses.
First, we look at the eﬀects of the accident on diﬀerent health outcomes, and compare them
with the estimated eﬀects of the accident on labor market outcomes.24 The idea is that if the
accident causally aﬀects subsequent labor market outcomes, we should observe dynamic eﬀects
of the accident on health outcomes that resemble the dynamic eﬀects of the accident on labor
market outcomes over time. Figure4 depicts the estimated eﬀect of the accident on sick leave
for the 20 quarters after the accident, based on the dynamic model, which controls in addition
for leads starting at quarter minus 7. First it can be noted that the coeﬃcients capturing the
quarters prior to the accident are individually and jointly statistically insigniﬁcant, quantitatively
very small (basically zero) and do not exhibit a trend. That means, the timing evidence clearly
suggests that the accident causally aﬀects subsequent sick leave. On top of that it rules out that
any pre-treatment injury or (arising) illness has triggered the accident (which could also be a
potential confounding factor). As expected, in the quarter of the accident we ﬁnd a huge spike;
treated workers are estimated to be 18.6 days (or 490 percent) more on sick leave. This positive
eﬀect decreases thereafter, however, is still statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent from zero until one year
after the accident. As we will see in detail below, these dynamic eﬀects of the accident on sick
leave are perfectly compatible with the estimated eﬀects of the accident on labor market outcomes.
The same patterns as in the case of sick leave, can be observed for other health outcomes, such
as the incidence of hospitalization and extramural health expenditures. (Details are provided in
Appendix B.) In sum, this ﬁrst supplementary analysis of health outcomes supports our causal
interpretation. The only potential pitfall left is given by an unobserved time-variant confounding
factor that exhibits dynamic eﬀects on labor market outcomes that by coincidence resemble the
eﬀects of the accident on health outcomes.
In order to provide evidence against the latter case, we look at the eﬀect of less severe accidents.
If the accident is indeed the causal determinant of subsequent labor market outcomes, we expect
smaller treatment eﬀects in the case of less severe accidents. Relating to the reasoning from
24 Since data on health outcomes is only available for workers from Upper Austria this analysis is based on a
sub-sample of the data. Details on the data, which are derived from the database of the Upper Austrian Health
Insurance Fund, are provided in Appendix B.
10above, it seems highly unlikely that less and more severe accidents are consistently correlated with
unobserved time-variant confounding factors that have small and larger eﬀects on labor market
outcomes (resembling by coincidence the dynamic eﬀects of the accident on health outcomes). The
analysis (summarized in Appendix C) indeed shows that less severe accidents are estimated to
have less (or no) eﬀects on labor market outcomes.
As a ﬁnal check, we aim to show that accidents are caused by exogenous events. While it is hard
to measure all (or even one) factor, we managed at least to obtain information on local weather
and lightening conditions. The regression analysis summarized in Appendix D shows – in line with
existing literature (Qiu and Nixon, 2008) – that weather conditions are statistically signiﬁcant
determinants of accidents. For instance, we ﬁnd that on days with an above average precipitation
(i.e. compared to an historical average at this speciﬁc location on this speciﬁc calendar day) the
likelihood of an accident increases for women (men) by 4 4 (2 0) percentage points. This result
supports the idea that commuting accidents are driven by exogenous (or random) factors that
justify its interpretation as a negative health shock.25
5 Estimation results
This section presents our estimation results in the following way: ﬁrst, we discuss the ﬁndings
on the eﬀects of an accident on employment and income for all workers. We ﬁnd that such a
negative health shock deteriorates labor market outcomes along any dimension. In a next step,
we explore heterogeneous treatment eﬀects across sex, occupation, and age. Then we examine
potential adapting behavior of treated workers in terms of job mobility across employers and
industries. Finally, we distinguish between diﬀerent forms of non-employment and show to what
extent treated workers leave the labor market through unemployment, retirement and parental
leave.
5.1 Baseline results
We consistently ﬁnd that individuals who have experienced a commuting accident are subsequently
less likely employed, and (conditional on being employed) earn lower wages. Based on our exactly
matched sample, the static employment model estimates that treated individuals are on average
3 3 percentage points less likely employed in the twenty quarters after the accident. Notably, the
estimated coeﬃcients of the OLS and the FE model (see ﬁrst line in Table2) are basically identical.
We interpret this as evidence that our research design is very clean and that accidents on the way
to and from work are exogenous in our context. Based on our full sample we ﬁnd somewhat
larger employment eﬀects (about minus 4 7 percentage points). However, again, the inclusion of
individual ﬁxed eﬀects has almost no impact on the estimated coeﬃcients (see TableA.3 in the
Appendix A).
The estimation results of the dynamic employment model corroborate the ﬁndings of the static
25We also tried to exploit this exogenous variation in the likelihood of a commuting within an instrumental variable
framework. This approach gives qualitatively very similar results (compared to the results based on the estimation
strategy explained above), however, the estimated eﬀects are larger in (in absolute terms) and the standard errors
increase considerably. Given that the F-statistic on the excluded weather variable in the ﬁrst stage of our two-stage
least square estimation is not suﬃciently high (especially for males), we decided not to present these results in more
detail.
11model and reveal interesting patterns. The upper panel of Figure5 shows that treated units
are (compared to control units) equally likely employed in the quarter of the accident. It seems
plausible that employers may hesitate to layoﬀ workers during their sick leave, or more generally,
shortly after an accident. However, starting with quarter two after the accident a statistically
negative employment eﬀect for treated units can be observed each quarter in the post-treatment
period. The timing of the accident and the employment eﬀect provides strong evidence against
reverse causality. The largest eﬀect (in absolute terms) can be observed in quarter two after the
accident (about minus 4 8 percentage points). Over the following twelve quarters the eﬀect is stable
around minus 2 8 percentage points, and from quarter ﬁfteen to twenty the eﬀect is estimated to
decrease somewhat again. In sum, these results show that a negative health shock has persistent
eﬀects on employment.
When we look at wage eﬀects, we have to restrict our sample to employment spells. It is hard to
evaluate whether the resulting sample selection bias is relevant in size. However, it seems plausible
to assume that the treated workers who return to employment are positively selected in terms of
their willingness to perform. Given that our results discussed below would underestimate the true
eﬀect of the negative health shock on wages in absolute terms, since we compare the positively
selected treated workers with the average (or unselected) control workers. When we interpret the
estimated eﬀects on wages, we further have to keep in mind that we only observe daily and not
hourly wages. Variation in daily wages may result from an eﬀect of the accident on working hours
and/or the wage rate. While we have no information on the exact number of working hours,
we can distinguish (since 2002) between full-time and part-time workers. Since we do not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant eﬀect of the accident (for any sub-group) on labor supply at the intensive margins
(see, for instance, FigureA.3 in the Appendix A), we suggest interpreting the estimated eﬀects as
variation in the wage rate.
The static results on wages (see ﬁrst line in Table3) reveal that treated individuals are disadvan-
taged, even if they manage to stay in employment. Conditionally on being employed, speciﬁcation
FE-I suggests that an accident reduces wages by about 1 4 percent. The corresponding OLS es-
timate is equal to 1 1 percentage points. In line with that the corresponding dynamic model
(summarized in the lower panel of Figure5) shows a negative eﬀect that increases from quarter
one to quarter six after the accident, and settles at about minus two percentage points thereafter.
The vast majority of these coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant (at least) at the ﬁve percent level.
Overall, we interpret these results as evidence that negative health shocks have adverse eﬀects
on labor market outcomes, and argue that this evidence establishes a clear causal eﬀect of health
on income. The persistence of the observed eﬀects is remarkable. Negative health shocks – causing
an initial average sick leave of about 46 days – have negative eﬀects on employment and wages
which are present even after twenty quarters (or ﬁve years). This suggests that injuries cause
long-lasting impairments that result in either complete displacement or impede career success.
This can be explained by reduced work capacity or productivity. For instance, a back injury from
a slip and fall accident might not only limit the eﬀectiveness of a manual worker, but also that
of an oﬃce worker, who can not sit at a desk for long periods of time anymore. Alternatively,
workers may have a reduced willingness to perform after the negative health shock, since they are
more concerned about their health. It is also possible, that treated workers miss out on promotion
opportunities, or hesitate to change job and forgo other more prospective career paths.
125.2 Heterogeneous treatment eﬀects
Next, we explore heterogenous treatment eﬀects along the dimensions of sex, broad occupation,
and age. We are interested whether the causal eﬀect of health on labor market outcomes diﬀers
across these sub-groups since they typically diﬀer in important characteristics such as their labor
supply elasticity, the type of work (manual vs. non-manual), their ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital
and their labor market experience. These characteristics may aﬀect the magnitude of the eﬀect
of a negative health shock on labor market outcomes. For the interpretation of our estimations
results in this section we presume that the type of accident is not correlated with the workers’
characteristics which are used to split the sample.
Looking at the point estimates (from an equivalent analysis as above) based on the diﬀerent
sub-samples (see lines two to ﬁve in Table2), one can see that females are hit harder than males
(minus 3 6 vs. 2 9 percentage points), and blue-collar workers are more aﬀected than white collar
workers (minus 3 5 vs. 3 0 percentage points). The same patterns can be observed if we split the
sample by both, occupation and sex (see lines six to nine in Table2). Female blue-collar workers
suﬀer the most (minus 3 9 percentage points), and male white-collar workers are aﬀected least
(minus 2 1 percentage points). This suggests that sub-groups which are typically less attached to
the labor market (i.e. females26), or have on average more unemployment spells (i.e. blue-collar
workers), have also a higher likelihood to withdraw from employment as a consequence of a negative
health shock. This can be explained by a higher lay-oﬀ probability (after a negative health shock);
blue-collar workers – and also tendentiously part-time workers – have less ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital and can be substituted more easily. Alternatively, factors that prevent an eﬃcient level of
sick leave (i.e. presenteeism), health-care utilization or rehabilitation – such as (perceived) low
job security, liquidity constraints, or even information problems – may be more relevant for these
sub-groups, and lead to lasting health problems impeding subsequent employment.
The estimation results from the dynamic model are presented stratiﬁed by sex and occupation.
The results on employment (see Figure6) are in line with the static results, and provide (especially)
in combination with the results on wages (see Figure7) further insights. Let us consider male
workers ﬁrst. Treated male white-collar workers experience initially (until quarter four) statistically
signiﬁcant negative employment eﬀects, with a low (minus 5 7 percentage points) in quarter two
after the accident. For the following twelve quarters the estimated employment eﬀects are still
negative, however, not individually statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. Somewhat
surprisingly, with quarter sixteen some signiﬁcant eﬀects kick in again. The results on earnings
show that treated male white-collar workers who manage to stay in employment, do not experience
(with the exception of quarter two) any statistically signiﬁcant income losses.
Treated male blue-collar workers on the other hand, experience signiﬁcantly negative employ-
ment eﬀects throughout the whole post-treatment period under consideration. Starting with period
two, the eﬀect is pretty stable around minus 3 0 percentage points. And for those who stay in em-
ployment, we observe (mostly individually statistically signiﬁcant) also income losses between two
and three percent.27 An obvious diﬀerence between blue- and white-collar workers is the manual
26The female labor force participation rate (for women between 15 and 64 years of age) was 63 7 percent in 2002;
the ﬁgure for males was 79 7 percent (Source: Statistics Austria). About 36 percent of the female workforce was
employed part-time; compared to only 5 percent of the male workforce (Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey,
2002).
27Note that, in line with the dynamic earnings results, the corresponding static results in Table3 (see speciﬁcation
13nature of their tasks. This may (besides the aforementioned arguments) exacerbate the return to
work for blue-collar worker after a negative health shock. Conditional on employment, reduced
(physical) working capacity seems to reduce earnings of blue-collar workers. This is also in line
with the observation that the output of blue-collar workers is typically more easily observable; for
instance (in contrast to white collar-workers) some blue-collar workers are paid by piece rates.
In the case of females, we observe diﬀerent patterns of heterogenous treatment eﬀects. Some-
what surprisingly, the negative health shock has stronger eﬀects – at least clearly in terms of
earnings – on female white-collar workers compared to their blue-collar counterparts. As we know
from the static model, both groups are less likely employed after the accident. The dynamic model
(Figure7) reveals that for female white-collar workers the eﬀect is (starting with quarter two) pretty
stable around minus four percentage points over the whole post-treatment period. In contrast, the
female blue-collar workers’ adjustment path is non-monotonic. After the accident (quarter one to
ﬁve) we see statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects around minus four percentage points. From quarter six
to fourteen, however, the eﬀects (and their signiﬁcance) decreases in absolute terms. Thereafter,
size and signiﬁcance rise again (up to minus eight percentage points). With respect to earnings
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects are (in both models) only present for female white-collar workers;
the eﬀects increase over time and amount up to minus four percentage points.
The peculiar dynamics of female blue-collar workers’ employment eﬀects, as well as the diﬀeren-
tial patterns of heterogenous treatment eﬀects across sexes, can be explained by adapting behavior
(job mobility) and a causal eﬀect of the negative health shock on fertility (to be discussed in detail
below). We ﬁnd that treated female blue-collar workers have a higher incidence of job mobility
exactly in quarter six, when the negative employment eﬀects (temporarily) vanish. Moreover, they
initially reduce fertility (this increases ceteris paribus their employment) and starting around quar-
ter twelve the trend reverses. The result of stronger earnings eﬀect for treated white-collar workers
(compared to their blue-collar counterparts28) is in line with theoretical arguments suggesting that
labor market interruptions are more costly in the case of a job associated with ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital compared to a job where more general human capital is decisive (Schwerdt, Ichino, Ruf,
Winter-Ebmer and Zweim¨ uller, 2010). Clearly, internal labor markets and career concerns are
more important for white-collar than for blue-collar workers, who have typically less discretion
at work. However, it is a priori unclear why this eﬀect applies only to female, but not to male
workers. A possible explanation for this asymmetry might be diﬀerential physical demand at work.
Finally, we explore heterogenous treatment eﬀects along the dimensions of age. Therefore, we
deﬁne young (below 38 years of age) and old workers (38 years of age and above). The upper panel
of Figure8 shows that older treated workers suﬀer (compared to younger treated workers) more in
terms of negative employment eﬀects. In line with this, the static employment model (see Table2)
estimates a reduced likelihood of employment for older workers of minus 4 1 percentage points, and
for younger worker of minus 2 4 percentage points. However, among those treated workers who
manage to stay in employment, in fact, only the young workers experience statistically signiﬁcant
income losses (see lower panel of Figure8). Accordingly, the static earnings model gives an average
income loss for younger workers of 2 8 percent, and for older workers of minus 0 2 percentage points
FE-I) show only a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on earnings for male blue-collar workers, but not for their
white-collar counterparts.
28Notably, the reversion of the negative income eﬀect takes place in quarter six; the quarter with the statistically
signiﬁcant higher incidence of job mobility.
14(see Table3). This asymmetric results by age can be rationalized as follows. On the one hand
old workers recover less well29 (compared to younger workers), and are probably less attached
to the labor market. Both factors make it on average harder for older workers to stay (or to
return) to employment. On the other hand, among the treated workers who manage to stay in
employment, the young workers are probably those who (have to) forgo promotion opportunities
due to persistent impairments, which results in lower wage growth paths. Older workers are on
average more likely to be established in their careers, and since demotion is not a common practice,
they have only marginal income losses (compared to the control counterparts).
5.3 Adapting behavior
If treated workers are aware that their physical and/or mental impairments reduce their productiv-
ity at work – which will eventually lead to less career opportunities, lower wages, or even job loss
– they may re-evaluate their career, and consider a change in job, or even in occupation. Therefore,
we would expect an increase in job mobility after a negative health shock. Alternatively, treated
workers – especially those who still have suﬃcient work capacity in their current job – may turn
risk averse, and hesitate to change job or employer, even if they could expect higher wages or
attractive career opportunities. This eﬀect should decrease job mobility among treated workers.
In order to identify any adapting behavior we apply an equivalent estimation strategy as above
to examine job mobility of treated workers across ﬁrms and industries. In particular, we examine
the whole post-treatment period, and estimate the likelihood of an employer or industry change
in each quarter.30 Overall, we ﬁnd very little evidence that a negative health shock has any eﬀect
on subsequent job mobility. The estimation results of the static model of the likelihood to change
employer and industry are summarized (for diﬀerent sub-groups) in Table4. The only sub-group for
which we observe consistent statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀects are treated female workers; in
particular female blue-collar workers. Treated female blue-collar workers are (in a given quarter)
about 0 75 percentage points more likely to change their employer and industry (their sample
means of employer and industry change are 4.08 and 2.17 percent). For all other sub-groups, the
quantitative eﬀects are quite small and insigniﬁcant. In sum, we ﬁnd little evidence for adapting
behavior in terms of job mobility. However, in principle, we can not rule out that two opposing
eﬀects oﬀset each other.
Given that post-treatment job mobility may be inﬂuenced by the treatment, we did not control
for workers’ post-treatment (occupation or) industry in the estimation results on earnings discussed
so far. In principle, if switching occupation or industry has an eﬀect on (the loss of) earnings, then
the inclusion of respective control variables should have a discernable impact on the estimated
treatment eﬀects.31 However, since we have just seen that little adapting behavior has taken place,
we do not expect much changes in the estimated treatment eﬀects by including these additional
covariates. Comparing speciﬁcation FE-I and FE-II in Table3, where the latter includes also
dummies for broad occupation and industry, we indeed do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the estimated eﬀects across these two speciﬁcations. Even female blue-collar workers who are more
29In our estimation sample the duration of sick leave resulting from the accident is on average 48 days for older
workers, and 44 days for younger workers.
30Here, we exclude non-employment spells. If a worker returns subsequently into employment, and s/he returns
to the same ﬁrm/industry we do note rate this as job mobility.
31For a similar argument, see, Charles (2003).
15likely to change their employer and industry after the negative health shock do not beneﬁt from
their increased job mobility.
5.4 Types of non-employment
We have shown so far that a negative health shock has adverse eﬀects on employment. However,
we do not know yet through which channel aﬀected workers leave employment. In principle, this
requires the formulation of a multinomial choice model. To simplify things, we proceed in two
steps. First, we carry out a descriptive analysis and look at simple weighted diﬀerences between
treated and control units. In a second step we focus on speciﬁc channels, and apply binary choice
models as we have done above.
Figure9 provides weighted diﬀerences of diﬀerent labor market status between treated and
control workers stratiﬁed by sex and occupation. As a matter of fact, treated units are more likely
to be on sick leave or rehabilitation after the accident.32 This eﬀect peaks around quarter two,
shrinks thereafter, and slowly fades out over time. With some delay – compared to the incidence
of sick leave – the incidence of unemployment increases and ﬂuctuates over time. For both sexes,
the incidence of unemployment is higher among blue-collar workers, and in line with our results
from above, basically zero for male white-collar workers. Finally, we see that treated units are
comparably more likely to retire (i.e. disability retirement). This eﬀect increases over the whole
post-treatment period and amounts to plus two percentage points after twenty quarters for all
sub-groups. Taken together, this evidence suggests that part of the treated workers recover over
time and manage to stay in regular employment. While others struggle for a while (with periods
of sick-leave, rehabilitation and/or unemployment) before they decide/manage to retire.
For treated female blue-collar workers we ﬁnd an interesting pattern of the probability to be
on maternity leave, which allows inference on the impact of the negative health shocks on fertility
behavior. To explore this eﬀect in more detail, and to obtain respective conﬁdence intervals, we
look at the estimation result from a dynamic model summarized in Figure10. Treated female blue-
collar workers have a statistically lower likelihood of maternity leave until quarter twelve after the
accident. Thereafter, the relative incidence of fertility increases again, and eventually turns even
positive. How can this inverted U-shaped pattern be explained. The negative health shock may
aﬀect fertility through three diﬀerent channels. First, there may be a direct health eﬀect. Health
problems may reduce women’s fecundity or willingness to bear children. Second, fertility behavior
may respond to the reduced work capacity (or unemployment). Within this domain two eﬀects
are possible. The negative health shock may have a substitution eﬀect, since during a period with
reduced work capacity (or of unemployment) opportunity cost for having a child decrease. On the
other hand, a reduction of income (income eﬀect), may reduce the demand for children.
Our results suggest that right after the accident there is clearly no dominant substitution
eﬀect. The initial decrease may reﬂect a direct health eﬀect, an income eﬀect, or a combination of
both. The reversing trend starting in quarter twelve, however, may express a lagging substitution
32 It has to be noted that we observe only longer sick leave spells (i.e. at least nine weeks or longer) in the
ASSD. This results from the fact that workers receive their regular salary (so-called Entgeltfortzahlung) after an
occupational accident for at least eight weeks directly from their employer, and during this period no documentation
in the ASSD is required. (Workers with sixteen years of tenure or more receive their regular salary even for ten
weeks.) After this period the sick leave insurance system kicks in, and the sickness beneﬁts (so-called Krankengeld)
workers receive are documented in the ASSD. Short sick leave spells (as analyzed in Figure4) are only documented
by the Health Insurance Funds.
16eﬀect. It may take a while for treated workers to realize their disadvantage on the labor market.
Alternatively, women simply have an optimal number of children in mind, and they make up for
lost chances (e.g. due to a transitory direct health eﬀect after the accident). It is impossible
to disentangle these two explanations, but in any case both channels are causally related to the
negative health shock. Since we can not observe completed fertility, we can also not ascertain
whether the health shock only aﬀects fertility timing, or even the number of ever born children.
The absence of this eﬀect for treated female white-collar workers may be explained by less severe
income eﬀects and the direct health eﬀects (i.e. due to higher household income and less physical
demand at work).
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we interpret accidents occurring on the way to and from work as a negative health
shock to study the causal eﬀect of health on labor market outcomes. Data from the Austrian
mandatory social accident insurance allows us to observe the universe of these accidents which
have taken place between 2000 and 2002, and to follow these treated workers (along with exactly
matched control units) before and after the treatment in an exhaustive administrative database.
A ﬁxed-eﬀects diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach (Heckman et al., 1997) shows a persistent neg-
ative causal eﬀect of this health shock on employment and income. Treated workers – with an
initial average sick leave spell of 46 days, predominantly due to impairments in the musculoskele-
tal system – are signiﬁcantly less likely employed throughout the whole post-treatment period.
Even after ﬁve years we still ﬁnd an eﬀect of about minus four percentage points. After initial
periods with higher incidence of sick leave (or rehabilitation), treated workers are also more likely
unemployed, and a growing share of them leaves the labor market via disability retirement. Those
treated workers, who manage to stay or to return to employment, incur persistent income losses.
That means negative health shocks (or more precisely impairments in the musculoskeletal system)
may result in either complete withdrawal from employment or impede career success.
The size of the estimated eﬀects varies along the dimensions of sex, occupation, and age.
Employment eﬀects are strongest for sub-groups which are traditionally less attached to the labor
market, and older workers (who supposedly recover physically less well). The highest income losses
(about minus three percent) are observed for young workers. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not
observe much adapting behavior. Treated workers are only marginally more likely to change job
compared to control units. However, we have identiﬁed an eﬀect of the negative health shock on
fertility behavior. Treated female blue-collar workers initially signiﬁcantly reduce their fertility.
Towards the end of our period under consideration we see, however, an upward trend. Since we
can not observe completed fertility, we can not ascertain whether the health shock only aﬀects
fertility timing, or even the number of ever born children. More generally, this result indicates
that health may have further far-reaching eﬀects on other family outcomes, such as marriage and
divorce behavior.
Austria has a Bismarckian (social) health insurance system where basically every resident has
access to free health-care utilization and rehabilitation. While it seems plausible to ﬁnd similar
eﬀects in other European countries with comparable social insurance system, it is unclear what to
expect in other systems (such as in the U.S.). On the hand negative health shocks may have even
17more detrimental eﬀects on labor outcomes since liquidity constraints may prevent suﬃcient health
treatment. On the other hand, comparable less generous compensation payments in the case of
sickness (such as sick leave beneﬁts or disability pensions) may increase treated workers’ incentive
to re-integrate in the labor market. In future research, it would be revealing to compare the
eﬀect of health on income under diﬀerent social security arrangements. This may have important
implications for the optimal design of social insurance; the level of compensation payments can be
adjusted to maximize employment.
That means the identiﬁcation of the causal paths between health and income is not a purely
intellectual exercise, but has far-reaching implications beyond the ivory tower of academia. Causal
interpretations are also necessary to guide health and redistribution policy, or to make ethical
judgments on (health) inequality (Deaton, 2011). Having established the causal link between
health and income, one can argue that policies to reduce health inequality will also help to reduce
income inequality – an externality, eﬃcient policy design has to take into account. Finally, it will
help to improve our understanding of the deeper mechanism of the accumulation of human capital
and inter-generational mobility.
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20Tables and Figures
Table 1: Average characteristics by treatment status in the quarter of the accidenta
Full sample Matched sample
Control Treatment Control Treatment
group group group group
(N = 16 813) (N = 5 909) (N = 26 734) (N = 3 406)
Female 0.46 0.48 0.51 0.51
Blue-collar 0.45 0.59 0.57 0.57
Age 37.03 37.29 37.69 37.68
Academic degree 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
Non-Austrian citizenship
b 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.25
Tenure (in years)
b 5.90 5.50 6.75 6.61
Experience (in years)
b 15.03 14.89 15.83 15.58
Real daily wage (in Euro) 81.48 77.54 79.06 79.12
Commuting distance (in km) 27.83 32.10 25.93 26.13
Region of residence:
West (NUTS 1) 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.35
East (NUTS 2) 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.43
South (NUTS 3) 0.21 0.25 0.22 0.22
Abroad or unknown 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm size
b:
Overall mean 1170.94 1724.71 1563.61 2114.93
1 to 9 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.07
10 to 49 0.24 0.16 0.20 0.14
50 to 99 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10
100 to 499 0.24 0.32 0.26 0.32
500 or more 0.25 0.34 0.30 0.38
Industry of employer:
Agriculture, ﬁshing, mining & energy 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Manufacturing 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.29
Construction 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06
Wholesale, retail & repair 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.12
Transport & communication 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03
Services 0.43 0.44 0.49 0.49
Probability of long sick leave (pre-treatment)
c 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Sick leave resulting from accident (in days)
d - 48.4 - 45.9
a This table provides the average characteristics of all individuals by treatment status measured on the ﬁrst day
of the quarter of the (placebo) accident in the full sample and in the matched sample. Exact matching of treated
and control units is based on the following characteristics measured on the ﬁrst day of the quarter of the (placebo)
accident: sex, age (13 age groups: 25 − 26, 27 − 28, ..., 49 − 50), education (no academic degree, engineer,
MA/MSc, PhD), region of residence (West, East, South, abroad/missing), industry (agriculture, ﬁshing, mining
and energy; manufacturing; construction; wholesale, retail and repair; transport and communication; services) and
commuting distance (by quintile group plus additional groups for zero and missing distance). Further criteria are
the employment status (employed, not employed), broad occupation (blue-collar, white-collar), and the log of the
deﬂated daily wage rate (by decile groups plus an additional group for non-employed individuals) in the quarter of
the treatment and in each of the three preceding quarters. Further we use the quarter of the (placebo) accident
as a matching criterion. Note, some treated subjects may have more control subjects than others; to account for
that weights are used. b Characteristic has not been matching criteria. c See, footnote32 for a deﬁnition of long (vs.
short) sick leave spells. d This information is provided in the AWCB Database.
21Table 2: The eﬀect of an accident on employmenta
OLS FE-I
All workers -3.25%*** -3.26%***
(N = 1 231 822) (0.55) (0.55)
Male workers -2.84%*** -2.85%***
(N = 471 242) (0.65) (0.65)
Female workers -3.63%*** -3.64%***
(N = 760 580) (0.87) (0.87)
Blue-collar workers -3.46%*** -3.48%***
(N = 671 158) (0.75) (0.75)
White-collar workers -2.98%*** -2.98%***
(N = 560 664) (0.80) (0.80)
Male blue-collar workers -3.15%*** -3.17%***
(N = 284 095) (0.81) (0.81)
Female blue-collar workers -3.89%*** -3.91%***
(N = 387 063) (1.42) (1.42)
Male white-collar workers -2.07%*** -2.07%***
(N = 187 147) (1.02) (1.03)
Female white-collar workers -3.40%*** -3.41%***
(N = 373 517) (1.08) (1.08)
Young workers -2.38%*** -2.40%***
(N = 541 269) (0.86) (0.86)
Old workers -4.08%*** -4.09%***
(N = 690 553) (0.69) (0.69)
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes
Age ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Quarter ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Further covariates (measured at time t0)
b Yes No
a This table summarizes estimation results of the eﬀect of a commut-
ing accident on subsequent employment (covering twenty quarters after
the treatment) stratiﬁed by diﬀerent groups (see lines) and based on two
diﬀerent speciﬁcations (see columns). Each entry reﬂects a separate esti-
mations, where the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual is
employed on the ﬁrst day of the quarter, and zero otherwise. Estimated
using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach based on an exactly matched
sample of treated and control units, where weights account for the fact
that treated units may have more than one control subject. Listed co-
eﬃcients are reported as the percentage point change in the probability
of being employed due to a commuting accident. Robust standard errors
(allowing for clustering by individuals and heteroskedasticity of unknown
form) are in parentheses below. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁ-
cance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respec-
tively. b The set of further covariates includes the following information
measured on the ﬁrst day (t0) of the quarter of the commuting accident:
sex, education (no academic degree, engineer, MA/MSc, PhD), citizenship
(Austrian, non-Austrian), broad occupation (blue-collar, white-collar),
place of residence (nine states), location of ﬁrm (nine states plus miss-
ing), commuting distance (by quintile group plus an additional groups for
zero and missing distance), industry of the ﬁrm (agriculture, ﬁshing, min-
ing and energy; manufacturing; construction; wholesale, retail and repair;
transport and communication; services), ﬁrm size (log of the number of
employees), tenure (in years), work experience (in years), and the quarter
of the (placebo) accident.
22Table 3: The eﬀect of an accident on incomea
OLS FE-I FE-II
All workers -1.13%** -1.40%*** -1.46%***
(N = 1 108 741) (0.47) (0.44) (0.40)
Male workers -1.10%* -1.23%** -1.22%**
(N = 441 278) (0.62) (0.59) (0.50)
Female workers -1.12% -1.58%** -1.69%***
(N = 667 463) (0.71) (0.66) (0.62)
Blue-collar workers -1.25%* -1.36%** -1.01%*
(N = 598 028) (0.64) (0.61) (0.52)
White-collar workers -1.08% -1.56%** -2.05%***
(N = 510 713) (0.70) (0.64) (0.59)
Male blue-collar workers -1.59%** -1.73%** -1.21%**
(N = 263 291) (0.78) (0.74) (0.61)
Female blue-collar workers -0.53% -0.65% -0.51%
(N = 334 737) (1.11) (1.04) (0.97)
Male white-collar workers -0.13% -0.19% -1.10%
(N = 177 987) (0.1.01) (0.95) (0.82)
Female white-collar workers -1.48% -2.25%*** -2.55%***
(N = 332 726) (0.92) (0.84) (0.80)
Young workers -2.20%*** -2.54%*** -2.82%***
(N = 469 235) (0.79) (0.75) (0.66)
Old workers -0.15% -0.38% -0.21%
(N = 639 506) (0.55) (0.50) (0.46)
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes
Age ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Quarter ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Further covariates measured at t0
b Yes No No
Further covariates measured at tx
c No No Yes
a This table summarizes estimation results of the eﬀect of a commuting accident
on the subsequent daily wage rate (covering twenty quarters after the treatment)
stratiﬁed by diﬀerent groups (see lines) and based on three diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions (see columns). Each entry reﬂects a separate estimation using all quarters
where individuals have been employed. The dependent variable is equal to the
log of the deﬂated daily wage rate. Estimated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences ap-
proach based on an exactly matched sample of treated and control units, where
weights account for the fact that treated individuals may have more than one con-
trol subject. Listed coeﬃcients are reported as the percent change in the daily
wage rate due to a commuting accident. Robust standard errors (allowing for
clustering by individuals and heteroskedasticity of unknown form) are in paren-
theses below. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-percent
level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively. b This set of further co-
variates measured on the ﬁrst day (t0) of the quarter of the commuting accident
includes the following information: sex, education (no academic degree, engineer,
MA/MSc, PhD), citizenship (Austrian, non-Austrian), broad occupation (blue-
collar, white-collar), place of residence (nine states), location of ﬁrm (nine states
plus missing), commuting distance (by quintile group plus an additional groups
for zero and missing distance), industry of the ﬁrm (agriculture, ﬁshing, mining
and energy; manufacturing; construction; wholesale, retail and repair; transport
and communication; services), ﬁrm size (log of the number of employees), tenure
(in years), work experience (in years), and the quarter of the (placebo) accident.
c This set of time-varying covariates measured on the ﬁrst day of each quarter
includes the following information: broad occupation (blue-collar, white-collar)
and the industry of the ﬁrm (agriculture, ﬁshing, mining and energy; manufac-
turing; construction; wholesale, retail and repair; transport and communication;
services).
23Table 4: The eﬀect of an accident on job-mobilitya
Employer Industry
change change
All workers 0.21% 0.18%
(N = 1 108 741) (0.16) (0.12)
Male workers -0.06% 0.05%
(N = 441 278) (0.24) (0.17)
Female workers 0.51%** 0.32%*
(N = 667 463) (0.22) (0.18)
Blue-collar workers 0.09% 0.24%
(N = 598 028) (0.24) (0.18)
White-collar workers 0.37%* 0.10%
(N = 510 713) (0.21) (0.16)
Male blue-collar workers -0.27% -0.04%
(N = 263 291) (0.31) (0.22)
Female blue-collar workers 0.76%** 0.74%**
(N = 334 737) (0.38) (0.31)
Male white-collar workers 0.41% 0.25%
(N = 177 987) (0.34) (0.26)
Female white-collar workers 0.34% 0.02%
(N = 332 726) (0.27) (0.21)
Young workers 0.22% 0.20%
(N = 469 235) (0.27) (0.21)
Old workers 0.20% 0.15%
(N = 639 506) (0.19) (0.14)
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Age ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Quarter ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
a This table summarizes estimation results of the eﬀect of a commut-
ing accident on subsequent job mobility across ﬁrms (ﬁrst column)
and across industries (second column). Each entry reﬂects a separate
estimation using all quarters where individuals have been employed.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual is changing
employer/industry, and zero otherwise. Estimated using a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences approach based on an exactly matched sample of treated
and control units, where weights account for the fact that treated
units may have more than one control subject. Listed coeﬃcients are
reported as the percentage point change in the probability of being
employed due to a commuting accident. Robust standard errors (al-
lowing for clustering by individuals and heteroskedasticity of unknown
form) are in parentheses below. *, ** and *** indicate statistical sig-
niﬁcance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level,
respectively.
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a These graphs show the distribution of commuting accidents by weekday (upper panel) and daytime
(lower panel) based on the sample of the 5 909 treated individuals with a least two weeks of sick
leave after the commuting accident.
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a These graphs show the employment rate and the average deﬂated daily log wage (conditional on employment) of all
individuals by treatment status. The number of treated individuals is 5 909, and the number of control individuals is
16 813.
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Coef. FE-I 95 % CI
a This graph summarizes estimation results of the eﬀect of a commuting accident on the (prior and) subsequent
incidence of sick leave. The dependent variable is equal to the number of days on sick leave per quarter and has an
overall sample mean (standard deviation) of 3 8 (9 8). Estimated using a dynamic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach
based on an exactly matched sample of treated and control individuals working in Upper Austria (N = 82 355
with 616 treated individuals and 2 466 control individuals), where weights account for the fact that treated units
may have more than one control subject. The estimation controls for individual, age and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects.
The entries give the estimated eﬀect of a commuting accident r quarters ago on the current sick leave (see δr in
equation 2). The conﬁdence interval (CI) is based on robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by individuals
and heteroskedasticity of unknown form).
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a These graphs summarize estimation results of a commuting accident on subsequent employment (upper panel) and the
deﬂated daily log wage conditional on employment (lower panel). Estimated using a dynamic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach based on an exactly matched sample of treated (N= 3 406) and control individuals (N= 26 734), where weights
account for the fact that treated individuals may have more than one control subject. Each estimation includes the same
set of control variables as speciﬁcation FE-I in Table2. The entries give the estimated eﬀect of a commuting accident r
quarters ago on current labor market outcomes (see δr in equation 2). The conﬁdence intervals (CI) are based on robust
standard errors (allowing for clustering by individuals and heteroskedasticity of unknown form).
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Female white-collar workers
Quarters since (potential) accident
Coef. FE-I 95 % CI
a These graphs summarize estimation results of a commuting accident on subsequent employment for four sub-groups of workers, which are equivalent to the
results presented in the upper panel of Figure5 for the full sample of workers. See, notes to Figure5. Male blue-collar workers: N = 1 187 treated and N = 5 760
control workers; female blue-collar workers: N = 756 treated and N = 8 704 control workers; male blue-collar workers: N = 491 treated and N = 4 094 control
workers; female blue-collar workers: N = 972 treated and N = 8 176 control workers.
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Female white-collar workers
Quarters since (potential) accident
Coef. FE-I 95 % CI
a These graphs summarize estimation results of a commuting accident on the subsequent deﬂated daily log wage (i.e. conditional on employment) for four
sub-groups of workers, which are equivalent to the results presented in the lower panel of Figure5 for the full sample of workers. See, notes to Figure5. Male
blue-collar workers: N = 1 187 treated and N = 5 760 control workers; female blue-collar workers: N = 756 treated and N = 8 704 control workers; male
blue-collar workers: N = 491 treated and N = 4 094 control workers; female blue-collar workers: N = 972 treated and N = 8 176 control workers.
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Daily wage (conditional on employment)
Quarters since (potential) accident
Coef. FE-I - young workers 95 % CI
Coef. FE-I - old workers 95 % CI
a These graphs summarize estimation results of a commuting accident on subsequent employment (upper panel) and deﬂated
daily log wage conditional on employment (lower panel) for young and old workers separately, which are equivalent to the
results presented in Figure5 for the full sample of workers. Young workers have been below 38 years of age (N = 1 672
treated and N = 11 576 control workers) and old workers have been at least 38 years of age (N = 1 734 treated and 15 158
control workers) at the time of the accident. See notes to Figure5.
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a These graphs show the diﬀerences in the average rate of diﬀerent types of non-employment between matched treated and control individuals after the
(potential) accident by sex and occupation.
3
3Figure 10: The dynamic eﬀect of an accident on the subsequent probability to be on
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Female white-collar workers
Quarters since (potential) accident
Coef. FE-I 95 % CI
a These graphs summarize estimation results of a commuting accident on the subsequent probability to be on maternity
leave. Estimated using a dynamic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach based on an exactly matched sample of treated and
control females, where weights account for the fact that treated females may have more than one control subject. Each
estimation includes the same set of control variables as speciﬁcation FE-I in Table2 and is based on the same number of
observations. The entries give the estimated eﬀect of a commuting accident r quarters ago on the current probability of
being on maternity leave (see δr in equation 2). The conﬁdence intervals (CI) are based on robust standard errors (allowing
for clustering by individuals and heteroskedasticity of unknown form).
34Appendix A Additional tables and ﬁgures
Table A.1: The eﬀect of an accident (with hospitalization) on employmenta
OLS FE-I
All workers -5.27%*** -5.30%***
(N = 354 733) (1.06) (1.06)
Male workers -5.16%*** -5.20%***
(N = 150 735) (1.26) (1.26)
Female workers -5.37%*** -5.39%***
(N = 203 998) (1.70) (1.69)
Blue-collar workers -8.08%*** -8.11%***
(N = 169 125) (1.58) (1.58)
White-collar workers -2.47%* -2.49%*
(N = 185 608) (1.38) (1.38)
Male blue-collar workers -7.58%*** -7.61%***
(N = 74 895) (1.70) (1.70)
Female blue-collar workers -8.94%*** -8.96%***
(N = 94 230) (3.19) (3.17)
Male white-collar workers -1.13% -1.19%
(N = 75 840) (1.72) (1.73)
Female white-collar workers -3.28%* -3.30%*
(N = 109 768) (1.94) (1.94)
Young workers -3.85%** -3.88%**
(N = 152 767) (1.64) (1.64)
Old workers -6.55%*** -6.60%***
(N = 201 966) (1.35) (1.35)
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes
Age ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Quarter ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Further covariates (measured at time t0)
b Yes No
a This table summarizes estimation results of the eﬀect of a commut-
ing accident on subsequent employment (covering twenty quarters after
the treatment) stratiﬁed by diﬀerent groups (see lines) and based on two
diﬀerent speciﬁcations (see columns), equivalent to those presented in
Table2 in the paper, however, using only treated workers that got hos-
pitalized and their matched control workers. See, notes to Table2 in the
paper.
A.1Table A.2: The eﬀect of an accident (with hospitalization) on incomea
OLS FE-I FE-II
All workers -0.32% -1.22%* -1.44%**
(N = 320 044) (0.81) (0.73) (0.70)
Male workers -1.31% -1.44% -1.80%**
(N = 141 499) (1.03) (0.97) (0.87)
Female workers 0.77% -1.03% -1.16%
(N = 178 545) (1.25) (1.10) (1.11)
Blue-collar workers -1.20% -1.95%* -2.15%**
(N = 149 430) (1.12) (1.03) (0.95)
White-collar workers 0.30% -0.65% -0.85%
(N = 170 614) (1.13) (1.03) (1.02)
Male blue-collar workers -2.09% -2.53%** -2.60%**
(N = 69 287) (1.34) (1.28) (1.08)
Female blue-collar workers 1.24% -0.59% -0.79%
(N = 80 143) (2.00) (1.70) (1.70)
Male white-collar workers -0.18% 0.30% -0.23%
(N = 72 212) (1.51) (1.45) (1.41)
Female white-collar workers 0.34% -1.27% -1.21%
(N = 98 402) (1.55) (1.41) (1.42)
Young workers -2.25*%* -2.49%** -2.67%**
(N = 133 035) (1.25) (1.16) (0.66)
Old workers 1.30% -0.14% -0.26%
(N = 187 009) (1.03) (0.93) (0.90)
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes
Age ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Quarter ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Further covariates measured at t0
b Yes No No
Further covariates measured at tx
c No No Yes
a This table summarizes estimation results of the eﬀect of a commuting
accident on the subsequent daily wage rate (covering twenty quarters af-
ter the treatment) stratiﬁed by diﬀerent groups (see lines) and based on
three diﬀerent speciﬁcations (see columns), equivalent to those presented
in Table3 in the paper, however, using only treated workers that got hos-
pitalized and their matched control workers. See, notes to Table3 in the
paper.
A.2Table A.3: The eﬀect of an accident on employment (full sample)a
OLS FE-I
All workers -4.70%*** -4.65%***
(N = 928 602) (0.43) (0.43)
Male workers -5.23%*** -5.20%***
(N = 493 685) (0.51) (0.50)
Female workers -4.28%*** -4.24%***
(N = 434 917) (0.70) (0.70)
Blue-collar workers -4.49%*** -4.42%***
(N = 452 209) (0.58) (0.57)
White-collar workers -4.28%*** -4.28%***
(N = 476 393) (0.64) (0.64)
Male blue-collar workers -4.91%*** -4.87%***
(N = 297 186) (0.62) (0.62)
Female blue-collar workers -4.22%*** -4.19%***
(N = 155 023) (1.15) (1.15)
Male white-collar workers -4.20%*** -4.21%***
(N = 196 499) (0.86) (0.86)
Female white-collar workers -4.56%*** -4.56%***
(N = 279 894) (0.88) (0.88)
Young workers -4.04%*** -4.06%***
(N = 490 478) (0.62) (0.62)
Old workers -5.28%*** -5.23%***
(N = 438 124) (0.58) (0.58)
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes
Age ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Quarter ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Further covariates (measured at time t0) Yes No
a This table summarizes estimation results of the eﬀect of a commut-
ing accident on subsequent employment (covering twenty quarters after
the treatment) stratiﬁed by diﬀerent groups (see lines) and based on two
diﬀerent speciﬁcations (see columns), equivalent to those presented in
Table2 in the paper, however, using the full set of available treated indi-
viduals and a 1% random sample of control units. See, notes to Table2
in the paper.
A.3Table A.4: The eﬀect of an accident on income (full sample)a
OLS FE-I FE-II
All workers -1.25%*** -2.03%*** -2.31%***
(N = 797 614) (0.42) (0.39) (0.34)
Male workers -1.35%** -1.94%*** -2.37%***
(N = 437 737) (0.54) (0.52) (0.43)
Female workers -1.57%** -2.40%*** -2.45%***
(N = 359 877) (0.65) (0.59) (0.54)
Blue-collar workers -0.03% -0.70% -0.71%
(N = 378 966) (0.54) (0.52) (0.44)
White-collar workers -1.65%** -2.27%*** -2.73%***
(N = 418 648) (0.65) (0.60) (0.53)
Male blue-collar workers -0.69% -1.09%* -1.05%**
(N = 256 804) (0.65) (0.63) (0.51)
Female blue-collar workers -0.70% -0.31% -0.28%
(N = 122 162) (0.98) (0.90) (0.84)
Male white-collar workers -0.61% -1.41% -2.29%***
(N = 180 933) (0.95) (0.89) (0.75)
Female white-collar workers -2.63%*** -3.12%*** -3.14%***
(N = 237 715) (0.86) (0.79) (0.71)
Young workers -0.67% -3.52%*** -3.64%***
(N = 407 478) (0.2.56) (0.63) (0.54)
Old workers -0.22% -0.51% -0.97%**
(N = 390 136) (0.51) (0.47) (0.42)
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes
Age ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Quarter ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Further controls (measured at t0) Yes No No
Further controls (measured at tx) No No Yes
a This table summarizes estimation results of the eﬀect of a commuting ac-
cident on the subsequent daily wage rate, equivalent to those presented in
Table3 in the paper, however, using the full set of available treated individ-
uals and a 1% random sample of control units. See, notes to Table3 in the
paper.
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a These graphs show the distribution of commuting accidents by daytime stratiﬁed by sex-occupation group (based on the sample
of the 5 909 treated individuals with a least two weeks of sick leave after the commuting accident).
A
.





















































































-20 -18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Daily log wage (conditional on employment)
a These graphs shows diﬀerences in the pre- and post treatment employment (upper panel) and income (lower
panel) between treated units (green line) and control units (base group) based on estimations that control for leads
up to minus twenty quarters before, lags up to twenty quarters after the (potential) accident, absolute (calendar)
time-ﬁxed eﬀects (consecutive quarter dummies), age-ﬁxed eﬀects, and individual ﬁxed/eﬀects.
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a This graph summarizes estimation results of the eﬀect of a commuting accident on the (prior and) subsequent
likelihood to work part-time. The dependent variable is equal to one if the worker is part-time employed on the ﬁrst
day of the quarter, and zero if the worker has a full-time employment. Estimated using a dynamic diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences approach based on an exactly matched sample of treated (N= 1 048) and control (N= 8 473) individuals
covering the period from 2002 through 2005, where weights account for the fact that treated individuals may have
more than one control subject. The estimation controls for individual, age and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects. The entries
give the estimated eﬀect of a commuting accident r quarters ago on the current likelihood of part-time employment
(see δr in equation 2). The conﬁdence interval (CI) is based on robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by
individuals and heteroskedasticity of unknown form).
A
.
7Appendix B Health outcomes
In this section we provide further results from our supplementary analysis of the eﬀect of a com-
muting accident on (prior and) subsequent health outcomes. Since we observe health outcomes
only for workers in Upper Austria, we have to restrict our sample to the 620 treated and 2 482
matched control individuals working there.1 In particular, we have access to the database of the
Upper Austrian Health Insurance Fund, which covers basically all private-sector employees of Up-
per Austria. This data includes individual records from 1998 through 2007 with all covered health
services that have been provided to a worker by general practitioners (or resident medical special-
ists). That means, we can observe each single doctor visit and each drug that has been prescribed,
with the exact date of service utilization. Moreover, the database includes exact information on
sick leave spells and days of hospitalization.
In order to examine the eﬀect of the commuting accident on health we use the following out-
comes (each measured per quarter): (i) days of sick leave, (ii) days of hospitalization, and (iii)
extramural health expenditures. For each outcome variable we estimate a dynamic model as de-
scribed by equation (2), where we in addition include leads starting at quarter minus 7. For the
incidence of hospitalization and extramural health expenditures (see FigureB.1 below) we observe
patterns, very similar to those of sick leave (as discussed in Section4 of the paper; see Figure4). In
the case of all three outcomes we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients capturing the seven quarters prior to the
accident are de facto zero and do not exhibit any trend. (The base group is equal to quarter minus
eight.) In the quarter of the accident we observe a huge spike, indicating that treated workers
experience a severe negative health shock: plus 18 6 days of sick leave, plus 2 days in hospital,
and plus Euro 47 8 higher health expenditures.2 The timing clearly suggests that the commuting
accident (and not any other unobserved time-invariant factor) is the causal trigger of this negative
health shock. After the quarter of the treatment, the negative health eﬀect decrease and dissipate
over time. The estimated eﬀects of the accident on health outcomes are perfectly in line with the
observed dynamic eﬀects on employment and income.
1Upper Austria is one of the nine states of Austria and comprises about one sixth of the Austrian population and
work force.
2Given mean values of 3 8, 0 3, and 88 2, this is equal to a 490 percent increase in sick leave, a 667 percent increase
in hospital days, and 54 percent increase in health expenditures.
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Extramural health expenditures
Quarters since (potential) accident
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a These graphs summarizes estimation results of the eﬀect of a commuting accident on the (prior and) subsequent
hospitalization and extramural health expenditures. In the upper panel the dependent variable is equal to the
number of days spent in hospital; this has an overall sample mean (standard deviation) of 0 3 (2 3). In the lower
panel the dependent variable is equal to extramural health expenditures in constant Euros; this has an overall
sample mean (standard deviation) of 88 2 (209 2). Estimated using a dynamic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach
based on an exactly matched sample of treated and control individuals working in Upper Austria (N = 89 822 with
620 treated individuals and 2 482 control individuals), where weights account for the fact that treated individuals
may have more than one control subject. The estimation controls for individual, age and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects. The
entries give the estimated eﬀect of a commuting accident r quarters ago on the current sick leave (see δr in equation
2). The conﬁdence intervals (CI) are based on robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by individuals and
heteroskedasticity of unknown form).
B.2Appendix C Less severe accidents
In this section we present the estimated eﬀects of less severe commuting accidents. That means, we
focus on the 5 488 treated individuals with accidents causing less than two weeks of sick leave. After
applying an equivalent matching procedure as above we have 3 323 matched treated and 27 349
matched controls for our estimation analysis available (i.e. 61 percent matching rate). The average
sick leave spell in the sample of matched treated is equal to 7 6 days with a standard deviation of
3 4 days. Given the reduced accident severity we clearly expect smaller eﬀects on subsequent labor
market outcomes compared to our main analysis of more severe accidents (i.e. at least two weeks
of sick leave) from above. TableC.1 summarizes the estimation results from the static model for
subsequent employment and earnings. These estimates can be compared with the results on more
severe accident listed in the second column in Table2 in the paper and with the second column in
Table3 in the paper. We see that less severe commuting accidents have smaller (or no) eﬀects on
employment. The estimated eﬀects on income (conditional on employment) are also considerably
smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant throughout. Since it seems highly unlikely that less and more
severe commuting accidents are consistently correlated with unobserved time-variant confounding
factors that have small and large eﬀects on labor market outcomes, this analysis strongly supports
our causal interpretation from above.
C.1Table C.1: The eﬀect of less severe accidents on employment and incomea
Employment Income
All workers -0.49% -0.10%
(N = 1 253 518) (0.53) (0.46)
Male workers -1.22%** -0.25%
(N = 437 768) (0.62) (0.69)
Female workers 0.15% 0.03%
(N = 815 750) (0.83) (0.61)
Blue-collar workers -1.23%* -0.44%
(N = 626 550) (0.73) (0.64)
White-collar workers 0.26% 0.18%
(N = 626 968) (0.77) (0.67)
Male blue-collar workers -0.91% -0.38%
(N = 236 610) (0.78) (0.84)
Female blue-collar workers -1.69% -0.52%
(N = 389 940) (1.39) (0.96)
Male white-collar workers -1.74%* -0.03%
(N = 201 158) (0.98) (1.19)
Female white-collar workers 1.31% 0.34%
(N = 425 810) (1.04) (0.79)
Young workers 0.45% -0.16%
(N = 591 315) (0.77) (0.63)
Old workers -1.67%** -0.04%
(N = 662 203) (0.71) (0.67)
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Age ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Quarter ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
a This table summarizes estimation results of the eﬀect of a commut-
ing accident on subsequent employment and income, equivalent to
those presented in the second columns of Table2 and Table3 in the
paper, however using less severe accidents (i.e. those with less than
two weeks of sick leave). See, notes to Table2 and Table3 in the
paper.
C.2Appendix D Weather conditions
In this section we summarize our estimation results on the eﬀect of weather conditions on the
likelihood of a commuting accident in the full sample. The purpose of this supplementary analysis
is twofold. First, we take weather as an example for a clear exogenous factor that aﬀects the
likelihood of a commuting accident to support the idea that these accidents are caused by exogenous
events. Second, this analysis complements the descriptive statistics discussed in Section2 by giving
the ceteris paribus eﬀects of diﬀerent socio-economic characteristics on the likelihood of having a
commuting accident.
To measure weather conditions on a worker’s way to and from work, we bisect the linear
distance between work and place of residence (i.e. in both cases we assume the center of the
zip-code area), and assign the closest weather station. Weather data is provided by the Central
Institute for Meteorology and Geodynamics – the national meteorological and geophysical service
of Austria. Data is collected based on 121 semi-automatic weather stations, which provide a set
of meteorological parameters (such as temperature, precipitation, relative humidity, barometric
pressure, sunshine etc.) on a hourly base. The average distance between the weather stations and
the mid-point between work and place of residence is about 8 3 kilometers (the standard deviation
is equal to 7 2 kilometers).
In the case of treated individuals, we look at the weather on the day of the commuting accident
(i.e. simple average of weather conditions between 5am and 7pm). For control individuals we
have randomly assigned a date from the treatment period. To deﬁne bad weather conditions we
compare diﬀerent indicators measured at a weather station on a certain date (during the treatment
period) with the corresponding historical average (based on data from 1990 through 1999) from
that particular calendar day. For instance, we deﬁne a day as ‘wet’ if the precipitation on this
day is above average precipitation on this calendar day from 1990 to 1999. A linear probability
model of the likelihood of having a commuting accident including a binary variable indicating such
a wet day is summarized for female and male workers in TableD.1 below. Further covariates are
the commuting distance, month ﬁxed eﬀects, weekday ﬁxed eﬀects, region of residence ﬁxed eﬀects
(NUTS 3), place of work ﬁxed eﬀects (states), industry ﬁxed eﬀects, weather station ﬁxed eﬀects,
and a set of socio-economic variables. Based on this simple speciﬁcation we ﬁnd that on days
with an above average precipitation (i.e. compared to historical average at this speciﬁc location
on this speciﬁc calendar day) the likelihood of an accident increases for women (men) by 4 4 (2 0)
percentage points. Clearly, these estimates are just lower bound estimates, since we can measure
the weather conditions on a worker’s way to and from work only with error.




Wet day 0.020** (0.009) 0.044*** (0.001)
Commuting distance:
1
st quintile 0.010 (0.014) 0.002 (0.015)
2
nd quintile 0.028** (0.014) 0.030* (0.016)
3
rd quintile 0.047*** (0.014) 0.065*** (0.016)
4
th quintile 0.047*** (0.014) 0.071*** (0.018)
5
th quintile 0.044*** (0.016) 0.040** (0.019)
Missing 0.062** (0.026) 0.072** (0.024)
Socio-economic characteristics:
Age 0.001 (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001)
Blue-collar 0.125*** (0.009) 0.104*** (0.010)
Academic degree -0.099*** (0.015) -0.142*** (0.020)
Non-Austrian citizenship -0.029*** (0.010) -0.017* (0.010)
Tenure (in years) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.002** (0.001)
Experience (in years) 0.001 (0.001) -0.002** (0.001)
Real daily wage in log -0.021*** (0.004) 0.002 (0.004)
Firm size in log 0.032*** (0.002) 0.026*** (0.002)
Intercept 0.342** (0.148) -0.315 (0.434)
Further control variables:
Weather station ﬁxed eﬀects F = 2 64 F = 2 72
Month ﬁxed eﬀects F = 6 18 F = 6 83
Weekday ﬁxed eﬀects F = 145 67 F = 116 26
Residence region ﬁxed eﬀects F = 0 85 F = 4 42
Firm’s region ﬁxed eﬀects F = 1 53 F = 4 35
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects F = 30 56 F = 1 48
Number of observations 11,147 9,802
Adjusted R-squared 0.107 0.098
a Robust standard errors (allowing for heteroskedasticity of unknown form)
are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-
percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively.
D.2